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Coleman and Jones extend the widely used  mies to variations in international prices and
Newbery and Stiglitz (1981) approach to measur-  raised questions about the desirability of domes-
ing welfare changes from commodity price  tic price stabilization programs. A popular
stabilization to a general equilibrium setting.  mechanism for this purpose is a vadable import
They denive the welfare changes in terms of net  levy scheme.
consumer and producer surplus, rather than in
terms of producer income as in the Newbery and  Coleman and Jones' analysis confirms that
Stiglitz approach.  domestic welfare is lower under trade policies
that stabilize domestic prices, as such policies
Coleman and Jones present formulas for  serve only to shift the price uncertainty from
measuring the welfare changes for domestic  producers and consumers to the government
price stabilization achieved through profitable  budget - while incurring the social costs of the
storage (as assumed by Newbery and Stiglitz)  distortionary tariffs and subsidies.
and for stabilization through a variable tariff
scheme. These formulas differ significantly, so it  Coleman and Jones focus on a comparison of
is inappropriate to use the Newbery and Stiglitz  the welfare effects of price stabilization under a
formula to justify the use of domestic price  variable tariff scheme and storage, but suggest a
controls such as a variable levy.  better option: to use financial instruments for
hedging against commodity price risks. This
In recent years, governments in many  requires that there be no capital controls - one
developing countries have liberalized their trade  of the main reasons private insurance is seldom
policies in the pursuit of improved economic  undertaken in developing countries.
perform.ance. But this has exposed their econo-
Tdhe  Podhcy  Research  Working  Paper  Scries  disseiinates the  fdings  of work  under  way  in henBank.  An  objectivetof  th  series
is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentations  are less than fully polished. The findings, interprctations. and
conclusions  in these  papers  dD not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
Produced by the Policy Research Dissenmination  CenterMeasuring  Welfare  Changes
from Commodity  Price Stabilization
in Small  Open  Economies
Jonathan R. Coleman
The World Bank, Washington, DC, U.S.A.
and
Chris Jones
The Australian National University, Canberra, AustraliaContents
page
1  Introduction......  . ..  . ..  . ...  . . . . . . . . ...  ..  . . . . . . . . . . . ..  ...  . 1
2  A  Diagrammatic  Exposition  of the Welfare Effects...........  4
2.1 The  Variable  TariffSchene  .....  S
2.2 Storage  .7...  7
3  The  Welfare  Effects  of Trade  Policies ..  . ..  . . . ..  . .......  ...  8
4  'he  Welfare  Effects  of Price  StabUization  wit Storagoe  ............  14
Estimatesof the Welfare Effets  of Price  Stabfiailization  .16
6  Conclusion  l...........19
Refppendix  ces.....................  . . ..  . 22
References .......................... 21. Introduction'
Many governments  in small open economies  use trade policies to reduce the variance in their real
domestic incomes caused by the variability  of world prices.  They  typically  use variable  taxes and
subsidies  to stabilize  the domestic prices of traded commodities;  buffer  stock schemes  are not used
because the countries  are two small for their efforts to affect world prices.  For example, the
governments  of Brazil, Ethiopia, Papua New Guinea  and Venezuela  apply variable tariff schemes to a
number  of imported  grain products.
In this paper we use an approach popularized  by Newbery  and Stiglitz  (1981) to measure the welfare
effects  of a mean-preserving  reduction in the domestic price variability  of an imported commodity  in
a small open economy. We compare the welfare effects of domest,c  trade policies (specifically,  a
variable  tariff scheme)  and profitable  storage such as that which could be carried out under an
international  commodity  agreement 2,'.  A variable tariff scheme uses tariffs and subsidies  on imports
to Insulate  the domestic price  from world price variability, while storage stabilizes  the world price.
Our key results are sumr.arized as follows:
(i) Trade  policies  provide  no aggregate  risk  benefits, i.e.,  they  do not reduce  the variance
in domestic surplus (combined  consumer,  producer and government  surplus); profitable
storage does, however, because it eliminates  world price uncertainty.
(ii) Trade policies and profitable  storage both reduce the mean value of domestic surplus.
'We are indebted  to Ron Duncan,  George  Fane, Mark Harrison,  Ngo Van Long, Vikram  Nehru  and Ted
Sieper  for their  helpful  comments  and suggestions.
VProfitable  storage means that the difference in the commodity price between two points in time must be
more  than  sufficient  to cover  storage  costs.
3rhe comparison  of domestic  trade  policies  with storage  is made  only for its analytical  implications.  The
storage  case refers to exogenous  price stabilization  and is compared  with a  variable  tariff scheme  where
stabilization  is undertaken  domestically.
IThese results are consistent  with those obtained  by Dixit (1987a, 1987b,1989)  who examines  the use
of trade policies under three different circumstances  accounting  for the lack of private insurance.'
He demonstrates  that with moral hazard and exclusive insurance  (Dixit (1987a)) and with adverse
selection (Dixit (1989)) there is no insurance  role for trade policy.  When  there are imperfectly
robserved  outcomes (Dixit (1987b))  he finds an opening  for trade policy to improve welfare.
Newbery  and Stiglitz assume domestic  residents  cannot insure privately  so that price stabilization
generates risk benefits by lowering  the variance  in real income. In this paper we assume that residents
are unable to insure against aggregate  uncertainty  caused  by world price fluctuations  because  there are
controls on foreign capital. This means they cannot smooth income by borrowing and lending  from
foreigners. This is a realistic assumption  as many  governments  in developing  countries  adopt capital
controls  to protect their exchange  rates and/or to restrict foreign investment'.
The approach adopted  by Newbery  and Stiglitz assumes  agents are homogeneous  with quadratic
preferences over real aggregate  income, i.e., domestic welfare is raised by a higher mean and aslower
variance. They derive a formula for the welfare benefits from stabilization  based on profitable
storage; it includes  risk benefits from a lower variance in producer income  and transfer benefits from
profitable  storage which raises mean domestic surplus (i.e., sum of producer  and conumser  surplus).
We adopt their approach, which is widely used in applied work (e.g., Hinchy and Fisher (1988),
Akiyama  and Varangis (1991) and Jolly, Beck  and Bodman  (1990)), and extend it to general
equilibrium  to derive formulae for the welfare effects of stabilization  in terms of net producer and
consumer  surplus rather than in terms of producer revenue.
We show that it is not appropriate  to use the Newbery and Stiglitz formula  based on profitable
storage 6 to justify the use of domestic price controls  because it provides an incorrect  assessment  of
the welfare effects. Storage and domestic price controls  deal with price variability in different ways
'  Dixit  and Stiglitz  (1981)  emphasize  the need to isolate  reasons  for the lack of private  insurance  if the
welfare  effects  of govemment  policies  are to be properly  understood.
'See Footnote  12.
e Domestic  storage  cannot  affect  the  world  price  so it must  be undertaken  internationally.
2and their welfare effects are therefore quite different. 7
Trade  policies stabilize  the domestic  price by shifting uncertainty  to the government  budget. This does
not lower the variance in domestic surplus, but It does lower mean surplus by the social costs of the
distortionary  tariffs and subsidies; domest.c welfare is unambiguously  lower under the scheme.
Storage reduces the variance in domestic  surplus by removing  uncertainty  from the world price,
however, it also reduces mean domestic surplus by transferring income to foreigners who receive the
gains from profitable storage; domestic welfare may rise or fall under these circumstances.
The results obtained  on the reductions in mean surplus under both storage and variable tariff schemes
are consistent with the work of Waugh (1944) and Oi (1961) who show, respectively,  that consumers
and producers benefit from price variability  when it is exogenous  to them; as it is in a small open
economy.  This is not inconsistent  with the work of Massell (1969) who reconciled  the findings of
Waugh  and Oi by demonstrating  that there are gains in aggregate  (or global) surplus when storage is
profitable;  in small economies  these gains accrue to foreign residents  when uncertainty  derives in the
foreign country.
Most previous work on stabilizing  traded goods prices examines  the effects of storage rather than
domestic  trade policies.  Hueth and Schmitz (1972)  extend the analysis  of Waugh, Oi and Massell to
examine  the distribution  of the welfare gains from price stabilization  between importers and exporters
of goods traded under large country assump!11ins.  Bieri and Schmitz (1973) extend their analysis  by
adding  existing  distortions  and Juct, Lutz, Schmitz  and Turnovsky  (1977) go further by allowing for
multiplicative  rather than additive  disturbances,  and they also examine  trade policies but do not
specify  the reasons for the lack of private insurance. In more recent work, Newbery (1984) shows
how large countries  can transfer income  from foreigners  by increasing  buffer stocks above their
competitive  level to raise commodity  prices in world markets.
7  Wright  and  Williams  (1988)  identify  two separate  factors  which  determaine  .he  welfare  effects  of price
stabilization.  One  is the  source  of price  uncertainty,  the  other  the  method  of stabilization  used  to reduce  it.
In a small  open economy  uncertainty  is exogenous  to domestic  consumers  and  producers  so we  confine  our
analysis  to a comparison  of the method  of stabilization  used  - a variable  tariff scheme  and profitable
intemational  storage.
3The paper is organized in the following  way.  In section  2 we present the intuition  for our results
diagrammatically. We then analyze  the welfare effects of a variable tariff scheme in section 3 using
the approach adopted by Newbery and Stiglitz and extending  it to a simple general equilibrium  model.
This Is repeated for storage in section 4 where we also compare the results for variable tariff schemes
and satorage,  anu in section S as an example,  we compare the welfare effects of price stabilization  for
commodities  such as wheat, maize, rice and sugar in a hypothetical  developing  country  setting. There
are concluding  remarks in section 6.
2. A Diagrammatic Exposition of the Welfare Effects
TIe intuition  for our results, which
are  presented formally in later
sections. is exposited using Figure I
below where x,  and  q  are,
respectively, demand  ar,d supply
for the imported good I when price
iS  stabilized  at its mean p,.  The  pH
-Dmestic  demand (D)  and  b
supply (S,)  schedules  are linear  P
under  the Newbery  and Stiglitz  /  . .___  o
approach because terms higher than  qL  1  qH  xH  11  XL  I
second  order in a Taylor series  I
expansion  around the indirect utility  Figure 1:  The Welfare Effects of Price Stabilisation
function are assumed  to be zero.
lhis also means there are two identifiable  changes  in welfare under their approach: the change in
expected  (or mean) domestic surplus, and the change in the variance of domestic surplus. We
initially consider  these changes  for the variable tariff scheme and then for profitable  storage.'
*  While the analysis  is undertaken  for an importable  good, the results will e3arry  over directly  to an
expotable  Sood.
42.1 7he Variable  Tariff  Scheme
Variable tariff schemes  can take different forms There are reference  price schemes which  use tariffs
and subsidies on inports to keep domestic  prices at a pre-determined  reference  price (e.g.,  igar in
Mexico),  price band schemes which use tariffs and subsidies  to keep domestic  prices within
pre-determined  upper and lower bounds  (e.g., basic grains in El Salvador), and minimum  price
schemes  which use tariffs to stop domestic  prices falling below pre-determined  floors (e.g., variable
levies in the European Community). The scheme we consider in this paper is a reference  price
scheme which stabilizes  the domestic  price of the imported  commodity  at its mean
For simplicity  assume the world price rises to  PH with probability  0.5 and falls to PL with
probability  0.5.  If the world price rises to  P,H  a subsidy  (s) lowers the domestic  price to pj,  and if
the world price falls to PL a tariff (t) raises the domestic  price to A.
Table I summarises  the changes in domestic  surplus with and without  the scheme; it compares the
variance  and the mean in each situation.  i  represents  the surplus when price is stabilized at its mean
value pA.
Table 1: A Summary  of the Changes in Domestic  Surplus under the Tariff Scheme 9
Without Scheme  With Scheme
i+d+f+e  x+e
P,,  i-b =x+d+f-e  i-(a+b+c)  =i-e
Mean  x+d_+f  x
Variance  e2 e2
Mean Surplus: When the domestic  price is stabilized  at its mean there is an expected  loss of:
Ea+c+d+, = a+c = d+f.
9 The results  in Tables  1 and 2 depend  on the linearity  assumption  which  makes  a=d, and c=f.  However,
the overall reduction  in welfare  under the tariff  scheme  does not depend  on the linearity  assumption  (which  *s
commonly  adopted  in applied  work). Note  also that a+b+c=e,  which  means  the scheme  is self-financing  over
time. To simplify  the analysis  we assume  a zero  interest  rate.
5When the world price falls to PL  the loss under the scheme, d+f,  Is the amount the potential  gain
from a lower domestic price, d+e+tf,  exceeds  the actual gain which consumers receive as tariff
revenue via the government  budget, e.  When  the world price rises to P,  there is also a loss of a+C.
It is the excess cf the subsidy cost, a+b+c,  which consumers  fund through the government  budget,
over the potential loss from a higher domestic  price, b.
Therefore, the tariff scheme reduces  mean surplus to i  from its free trade level i+d.f.  This
reduction is caused by the social costs of distortionary  tariffs and subsidies  which are used to stabilize
the domestic price.
The Variance in Surplus:  Under the Newbery and Stiglitz approach  there are potential risk benefits
if the scheme reduces  the variance in domestic surplus.
When the world price falls to p.  surplus rises less under the scheme (as tariff revenue e) than it does
in free trade (d+e+f).  This generates risk benefits; however, these benefits are offset by the extra
loss in surplus when the subsidy  applies.  A higher world price reduces surplus (as subsidy cost
a+b+c)  more than it falls in free trade (b).  This larger loss under the subsidy, a+c,  is exactly equal
to the smaller gain under the tariff, d+f.  Thus, the variance in domestic  surplus remains  unchanged
and there are no aggregate  risk benefitsfrom a variable  tariff scheme.
Thus, tariff scheme unambiguously  reduces aggregate  domestic  welfare; it lowers mean surplus (by
the social costs of tariffs and subsidies)  and leaves the variance unchanged.
62.2 Storage' 0
£
Table  2 below  summarises  the changes  in domestic  surplus  when  costless  storage  stabilizes  the world
(and  therefore  the domestic)  price  of good I at Its mean  value.",' 2 For the purpose  of comparing
variable  tariff schemes  and  storage  we assume  there  is a new  technology  Invented  which  makes  it
possible  to store  the commodity  at zero  cost. This results  In the world  price  being  stabilized  at its
mean  value.
Table  2: A Summary  of the Changes  in Domestic  Surplus  under  Storage
.________  Without Stonage  With Storage
P,  +id+f+e  x
Pu  i-b =I+d4f-e  x
Mean  x.d+f  x
Variance  e2 0
Mean  Surplus: When  the world  price  is stabilized  by storage  there is an expected  loss  of:
E(d+e.f-b) = E(a+c+d+J)  = a+c =  d+f,
where  b=e-a-c.
"I  We are not considering  storage  as a policy  option,  since  storage  carried  out by a small  open economy
cannot  affect world  prices. If storage  is economically  feasible  it will be performed  internationally  by private
operators. We  consider  it only  as a way  to capture  the welfare  effects  of exogenous  price  stabilization.
"Costl  storage is assumed by  Newbery and  Stiglitz when they measure their welfare effects under
storage.  If there  are storage  costs,  price variability  is not eliminated.  It is analytically  clearer  to ignore  storage
costs  since  we are not interested  in storage  as a policy  option.
12 We are grateful  to George  Fane for pointing  out that storage  could  also be interpreted  as a government
nn  price stabilization  scheme  which is financed  with foreign  borrowing. Instead  of financing  the scheme
domestically  to maintain  a balanced  budget  the govemment  finances  its budget  imbalance  intemationally;  it mns
a budget  deficit  (surplus)  and a corresponding  trade  deficit (surplus).  In the presence of  a- ital controls this
provides risk benefits because the government  has done what the private sector could not do; that is, borrow
from foreigners  when prices are low and repay these borrowings  when prices are high, thereby insuring against
price uncertainty.  If government  can borrow internationally  to finance a price stabilization  scheme, then the
welfare effects of storage and the tariff scheme  are identical. Both schemes  reduce welfare by the same transfer
losses.
7Consumers  gain more  from lower  prices  than  they  lose  from higher  prices, while  producers  gain  more
from higher  prices  than  they  lose from lower  prices. Notice  that  these  losses  under  storage  are equal
to the welfare  costs  of the variable  tariff  scheme.
The Variance  in Surplus: When  storage  stabilizes  the world  price at its mean  there is no variance  In
omestic  surplus,  while  in the absence  of storage  the variance  is e2.
Thus, the welfare  effects  of storage  are ambiguous;  it lowers  both  the mean  and  the variance  in
domestic  surplus.
When  the reference  price p,  is set at the expected  domestic  price  the scheme  is self financing.  See
Figure I where  the expected  tariff revenue, E(e), is equal  to the expected  subsidy  cost,
E(a+b.c).
3. The Welfare Effects  of Trade Policies
In this section  we formally  derive  the welfare  effects  which  were  exposited  diagrammatically  in the
previous  section. For simplicity  we assume  the world  price  of the importable  good i is the only
random  world  price  (on the basis  that  commodity  i's price  deviates  much  more  than  all other
commodity  prices). There are no tariffs  or subsidies  on other  commodities,  and  all goods  are traded
in world  markets  under  price-taking  assumptions.  Domestic  producers  use a domestic  input  (I) that is
fixed  in supply  and non-traded,  so its price (p,) is determined  domestically.  The price of a traded
good  (0) is chosen  as numeraire  so all variables  are measured  in units  of the good  whose
price po does  not fluctuate.
To capture  the full impact  of price  controls  on domestic  welfare  we need  to account  for the budgetary
consequences  of the stabilization  scheme. This is done  in a general  equilibrium  setting  by linking
consumer  income  to the government  budget. When  there  are controls  on foreign  capital  the scheme
must  be financed  domestically  i.e., the trade  account  must  balance.  For simplicity  it is assumed  that
any  surplus  or deficit  in the government  budget  impacts  on consumers  in a lump-sum  way. Under  the
variable  tariff  scheme  all tariff revenue  raised  (or subsidy  payments  miade)  when  the price  of good  I is
being  stabilized  is returned  to consumers  in a lump  sum; they  do not  observe  any direct  relationship
8veen changes in domestic prices and changes  in their lump-sum  share of the government  budget
;ed by the variable tariff scheme.  In other words, they face distorted domestic prices when
ng their consumption  and production  choices. Consumers  are endowed with a fixed supply of
omestic input and they are also owners of firms as shareholders;  the.  vfore, consumer income is
to firm profits plus the returns to the flxed domestic input less (plus) the budget deficit
is).  The role of these assumptions  will become clear in the following  discussion.
consumer  problem is:
f  Maximize  (EU(X)Aft - pX = 0)
Subject to:
A,  =fr  + pil  = pq  - without price stabilisation
|A?,  =  *.+  p,l  - 1(41-x,)  = pq-t(q-.)  - with price stabifisation
l  = p#7(I) - P,l
bol notation:
- is the vector of consumption  demands  for the j=O,I..........  I traded goods;
- is expected  utility  over the J+ I consumption  goods x;
- is the vector of (real) domestic prices which are world prices when there is no price
stabilization.  Price p,,  is the only random world price,
+1 - is the vector of (real) domestic prices which are stabilized  at their mean  Co) by the
tariffs and/or subsidies  on good i, so that the tariff (t) is now random, and domestic prices are
world prices plus the tariff (which is a subsidy when t<0).  Under the scheme E(i) =0;
the vector of (J) domestic  traded outputs which are produced  under perfect competition  by
9technologies  with  8q}lal,  >0,  and  02q1,a cO<  for all j,  and  1, is the usage of I by firm
*.  13
- is the domestic  iutput of good i when price p, is stabilized  at its mean;
* =pq(1)  -p 1l  - is the vector  of (real)  profits  of domestic  firms  which  is their  net traded  output  less
the cost of the non-traded input (pl)  used in production.  "11  profits accrue to the domestic
input which is fixed in supply;
K4=  pq  - is real income without  price stabilization,  which is equal to net traded output, where
E(JRo)  la Mo.  Since all goods are traded and there are controls on foreign
capital, pq =pg;
M, =pq -i(q  -X,)  - is real income  with price stabilization,  where E(I,)  wM,.  It is equal to
traded output, pg,  plus any tariff revenue (or less any subsidy  payments)  on imports  of good
iwhich consumers  receive in a lump sum from the government, - (q,  -X,).  Notice  how the
variable tariff scheme transfers world price uncertainty  from domestic prices to the
government  budget, and this impacts on consumers  through their share of this budget.  Once
again there is trade balance  because  of the foreign capital  controls.
After solving the consjamer  problem in (1), we obtain the indirect  utility functions:
EVl 0 fp,17(p,l))  - without  price stabilization,  assuming no tariffs or subsidies  are present;
and,
El,'  .j,l(,t,  l) -B,j  - with price stabilization,  where  B,  is the amount  of good O
consumeis  are willing  to pay (or require as compensation  when B, <O)  for reduced
price variability.
Following Newbery and Stiglitz (1981), B,  is the amount which makes EVl=EV,  when the real
domestic price of good i is stabilized  at its mean value  (0).  It will be negative  when the efficiency
losses caused by tariffs and subsidies  are greater than the risk benefits. After Taylor series expansion
around pj  we have (see Appendix  A. I for workings):
13 The model  can be extended  to allow  for extra  inputs,  both  traded  and non-traded,  but this  complicates  the
exposition  without  changing  the substance  of our findings.
10(2)  B,'  2  2  1 af
where  V ^  is the second partial of V for p,.  (Following Newbery  and Stiglitz  all higher order
terms are ignored.  This implies  that the demand and supply schedules  are linear.)  Notice how
income depends on domestic prices, tariff revenue (or subsidy  cost) and the fixed supply of the
domestic input (I) in general equilibrium;  therefore, all the in.ume effects caused  by changes in tariffs
and subsidies are captured in the terms  V. and  V1,.
Additional  insight  into (2) is obtained by evaluating  the partial derivatives  for indirect utility.
(3)  VP,  = V,.{  Iam;  - Xl}
Is the change in welfare when the domestic price of good i rises.  This is the familiar expression  used
In Roy's identity  which is augmented  by changes  In consumer  income in general equilibrium.
Using the budget constraint in (1) without  price stabilization:
3D-  D  i=S  P,  a 
where under profit maximization  with a fixed supply of the domestic input
J  O  l'pa  a,p
We can write (3) as:
(3.1)  VP  V,(q 1-x,)  =  -Vm,,
where m, *  -(q,-x,).
IINotice how the welfare effect of a change in price is determined  by the change  in domestic surplus in
general equilibrium where q,  captures the change in profit and x,  the change in consumer
surplus."  Consistent  then with the findings of Waugh  and 01 there are net consumption  gains on
imported goods, and net production  gains on exported goods, when price  pi  fluctuates  about  its
mean.
The change in welfare when the tariff (or subsidy) is raised at unchanged  domestic prices, is:
(4)  V, = V-  av  '
Using the budget constraint in (1) with price stabilization:
77,  aMt  I  _  +  4,-X,  at
where x,,  m (Ox 5/IM,)  and, because  no domestic  prices change, (qj/dt) -0.  We can rewrite (4) as:
(4.1)  V,  V- [ l '|
where x,,  - (fx 1lIM 1 ).
A tariff transfers the net gain in consumer  surplus on existing imports (m,)  as tariff revenue to the
government budget when the world price falls.
To compute  the potential risk benefits from price stabilization  we calculate  the second partial
derivatives  for the indirect  utility function and substitute  them into (2), where (see Appendix  A.2 for
workings):
B  Dy  using  a general  equilibrium  approach  we are able  to measure  the benefits  (or costs)  from stabilization
in terms of consumer  and producer  surplus. Newbery  and Stiglitz  stabilize  producer  income  to restrict the
effects  of price  changes  to one variable.
121  2  R  -2  1  2  R  _m  - M  m  I.
(2.1)  B,  m  M2'-  - i_,  a,  2a  dp,
with a  o2p,,  and R<O  the measure  of relative risk aversion.' 5
Expression  2.1 is similar  to equation  9.2 on page  123  in Newbery  and Stiglitz,  however,  they  confine
their  measure  of any  risk benefits  to one  good  by estimating  the benefits  to producers  from  stabilizing
producer  income. We replicate  their  approach  by assuming  the only prices  to change  are the world
price  of good  i and the domestic  input  price.
In this general  equilibrium  setting  any welfare  changes  are measured  in terms  of net consumer  and
producer  surplus  rather  than  being  restricted  to producer  income  as it is under  the Newbery  and
Stiglitz  approach. Equation  2.1 measures  the fall in expected  net surplus  when  the domestic  price  of
good i is stabilized. Notice  that there  are no risk  benefits  in equation  2.1 it is as though  consumers
aro risk  neutral  (with  R=O). When  tariffs  and  subsidies  are used  to stabilize  price, uncertainty  is
transferred  to consumer  income  through  the government  budget;  it is not removed  from  real income.
Therefore,  the only welfare  effects  for domestic  residents  in aggregate  are the efficiency  losses  from
distorting  tariffs  and  subsidies"  which  were previously  identified  in Figure 1 as areas  a+c+d+f.
Any  persistence  wth variable  tariff  schemes  must  be motivated  by a desire  to redistribute  income
when  there is price  uncertainty;  if so, there  are other  ways  of achieving  this which  are less  costly  to
welfare. Governments  quite  often  prefer  one-sided  schemes  because  they  minimize  budgetary
commitments  (e.g., minimum  price  schemes).  Tariffs  will be used  when  domestic  prices  fall below
'5  It is easy to verify that domestic  welfare  is unambiguously  reduced  by the scheme.  In each state
indirect  utility  is lower than it is in free trade, so their probability  weighted  sum must be lower than  the
probability  weighted  sum of their  free trade counterparts.
16 We implicitly  assume  that consumers  can borrow and lend domestically  so that income  distribution
through the government budget provides them with no risk benefits.  What they cannot do  is insure against
aggregate income variability when world  prices fluctuate because there  are  foreign capital controls. The
approach of Newbery and Stiglitz, which is adopted in most applied work for measuring  risk benefits, assumes
homogeneous  consumers  and producers and therefore measures  the benefits  from a reduction  in the variability  in
aggregate  income. Cassing, Hillman and Long (1986) demonstrate  the potential  that exists for tariff schemes to
raise welfare when heterogeneous  consumers cannot insure domestically.  The  redistributions  which occur
through the government  budget can substitute  for incomplete  domestic  insurance.
13the reference price but subsidies  are unlikely to be paid when domestic  prices rise above it. This is
more costly to welfare for any given reduction  in price variability  because it concentrates  on one,
rather than on two, distorting margins. To see this, raise the reference  price in Figure I to p,,  and
observe how the marginal welfare costs of higher tariffs eventually  rise more than they fall under
smaller subsidies.  Furthermore, trade policies are likely to become hostage  to producers who are
concentrated  politically. They will support schemes  which place floors under domestic  prices because
they provide protection from lower-cost  imports, but will oppose schemes  which prevent domestic
prices from rising.  Producer support for one-sided  price stabilization  reinforces  the budgetary
attraction of these schemes.
4. TIe Welfare Effects of Price Stabilization with Storage
It Is instructive  to compare the welfare effects of variable  tariff schemes  and storage. To do this,
assume the price of good i Is stabilized  at its mean by storage. With no tariffs, subsidies  or other
distortions, we have:
EV 0(p,At, (,1))  = EV,1{,M(d,l)-BsJ.
Expected  utility under price stabilization. EV,,  is no longer  stochastic  because storage removes
uncertainty  from consumer  income. By shifting  good i through time, foreign storage stabilizes  the
world price. Its value to consumers  (after Taylor series expansion  of the indirect utility function
around the mean price for good i) is:
(2.2)  Bs=  I  ap,M  R i  2  mv
(Iks  expression is rearranged in Appendix  equation A.3 to make it similar to the familiar Newbery
and Stiglitz expression for the benefits  from stabilizing  producer income.)
There are two separate components  of the welfare change. The first term in equation  2.2 is the risk
benefit which raises welfare, while the second term is the fall in expected  surplus (which Newbery
14and Stiglitz  refer  to as the transfer  benefit  from  profitable  storage  when  uncertairtty  is not exogenous
to domestic  consumers  and  producers).
Risk  benefits  arise  because  storage  reduces  the variance  in net surplus. This term  is absent  under  the
variable  tariff  scheme.
Recall  from  previous  discussion  that  world  price  uncertainty  is exogenous  to domestic  residents  when
goods  are traded  under  small  country  conditions. Therefore,  as Waugh  (1944)  and  Oi (1961)  have
shown,  consumers  and producers  are made  worse  off by price  stabilization.  Consumers  gain  more
surplus  when  price  falls  than  they  lose  when  price rises  while  producers  gain  more  surplus  when  price
rises  than  they  lose  when  price  falls' 7.
Using  the import  demand  function
illustrated  in Figure  2, these  losses  P 1
in surplus  are depicted  by the
shaded  triangles  (ABH+BDE).
They  are equal  in value  to the
welfare loss triangles (a+c+f+d)  in
Figure  for the variable  tariff  H
scheme. Therefore,  mean  surplus  L  E
falls  by the same  amount  under  m
storage as it does under the tariff  ml
scheme.  L  m
Notice  how  the risk  benefits  in  Figure 2:  The Welfare  Effects  of International  Storage
equation  2.2 depend  on the variance
in price (uo,)  and the level  of imports (On), as well  as the coefficient  of relative  risk aversion,  R.
Stabilization  avoids  an expected  loss in surplus  of P,ABR,, and  an expected  gain in surplus  of
pIBDpL,  which  generates  aggregate  risk benefits.  The larger  are imports  and the variance  in the
"It is also the case  that producers  are worse  off because  of the convexity  of the prefit function  with respect
to price. In our general  equilibrium  model  consumers  own  firms  so we concentrate  on the consumer  condition.
15world price, the larger are these fluctuations  in free trade surplus; and therefore, the greater are any
risk benefits from price stabilization.
The transfer losses depend on the variance in the world price (o2,) and the responsiveness  of import
demand to price changes (8m,1Dp,). When price is stabilized, the expected  transfer losses are equal
to ABH+BDE.  The larger Is the variance  In price and the more responsive import  demand is to a
change in price, the greater are these losses.
Thus, the welfare effects of storage are ambiguous  and will ultimately  depend  on the price
variance  (or =o,-), consumer risk preferences (R), the level of stabilized imports (im),  and the
responsiveness  of consumers  and producers  to price changes (amImlp,).
These effects differ from those identified  by Newbery and Stiglitz where transfer benefits for domestic
residents  augment the risk benefits  from reduced income variability. In contrast, our weffare
measures  for commodities  traded under small country assumptions  are ambiguous  because there are
transfer losses to foreigners  which are offsets to any potential risk benefits for domestic residents. It
is certainly the case that from a world perspective  there are net gains from profitable  storage, but
when uncertainty  originates in foreign countries, these gains accrue to foreigners. This was Massell's
(1969)  reconciliation  of the Waugh and Oi findings.
S. Estimates or the Welfare Effects of Price Stabilization
Estimates  of the welfare effects of price stabilization  can be obtained relatively  easily using the
expressions  derived in equations  2.1 and 2.2.  In this section we present estimates  of these welfare
effects for price stabilization  generated  through a variable  tariff scheme and through storage for
selected  commodities  in developing  countries. Many developing  countries  are net importers  of grains
(especially  maize, rice and wheat)  and are 'small" countries  in that their purchases of grain do not
affect international  prices.  Recently, major agricultural  trade reforms have been implemented  in such
countries, in which the overall strategy has been to introduce  competitive  forces by reducing
government controls  over trade.  In several cases most quantitative  restrictions on trade have been
eliminated and a variable tariff scheme to insulate  domestic  producers and consumers  from volatile
international  prices has been set up.  Welfare estimates  are made for a hypothetical  country importing
16maize, rice, sugar and wheat. Private price insurance  is assumed  to be absent due to government
restrictions  on access to foreign  capital.
The welfare effects of the tariff scheme are measured  by estimating  the parameters  in equation 2.1.
Included in this  expression is the variance  of international  price (o2I) and the slope of the import
demand function (8mj/8p). For storage (equation  2.2)  the components  to be determined  are the price
variance (0o?, the coefficient  of relative iisk aversion (R), a measure  of stabilized  income (M)  and
the level of imports  when the price'is stabilized (m,). Estimates  of these parameter values are
presented in Table 3 together with the elasticities  of import demand assumed.
Table 3: Parameter  Values for Welfare Estimates.
Commodity  Price  Elasticity of Import
Mean  Variance  Demand
Maize  1.48  0.45  -0.35
Rice  4.22  1.95  -0.40
Sugar  3.59  2.75  -0.40
Wheat  1.87  0.69  -0.30
International  prices of maize, sugar, rice and wheat for the period 1970-89  were deflated  by the US
producer price index. These deflated  series were used to calculate  the mean and variance for each
commodity  price, and since prices were stabilized  at their mean values, the variances of the tariffs
and subsidies  were set equal to these price variances. For each commodity  representative  linear
demand and supply functions  were selected  to provide import demand  functions which were used to
calculate  import levels at the stabilized  price (m-)  as well as the average value of imports  plus
consumption  as the measure  of stabilized  income (M)."  The coefficient  of relative risk aversion
(R) was assumed  to be unity.
*These  functions  were  obtained  from  Sullivan,  L  (1989).
17The results  are reported  in Table  4.  As  discussed  in section  3 there are no risk  beneflts  from using  a
variable  tariff  to stabilize  price  at its mean  value,  however,  there  are small  risk benefits  from storage.
Table  4: The Welfare  Effects  of Commodity  Price  Stabilization.
(percentage  of average  value  of consumption)
Conmmodity  Tariff Scheme  Storage  Newbery  & Stiglitz
Maize  _
Risk  Benefits  0.00  1.67  . 10.88
Net Surplus  Losses  0.61  0.61  4.35
Net Benefits  -0.61  1.06  6.53
Rice
Risk  Benefits  0.00  4.09  35.01
Net  Surplus  Losses  0.47  0.47  10.78
Net Benefits  -0.47  3.62  24.23
Sugar  r  __
Risk Benefits  0.00  12.31  89.55
Net  Surplus  Losses  12.58  12.58  23.06
Net Benefits  -12.58  -0.27  66.49
Wheat  ___
Risk  Benefits  0.00  2.63  9.00
Net Surplus  Losses  0.65  0.65  2.49
Net Benefits  -0.65  1.98  6.51
Insights  Into  the factors  which  determine  the sizes  and siguis  of the risk benefits  and transfer  losses
can be obtained  from Figure  2.  The risk benefits  depend  on the variance  in price and  the level  of
imports  (as well  as the coefficient  of relative  risk  aversion). Stabilization  avoids  an expected  loss in
net  surplus  of p,4Yp 4 and an expected  gain  in net surplus  of p1BDp, which  generates  aggregate  risk
benefits. The larger  are imports  and  the variance  In  the world  price, the larger  are these  fluctuations
in free trade  net surplus,  and therefore,  the greater  are any risk  benefits  from  price stabilization.  The
transfer  losses  depend  on the variance  in the world  price and  the responsiveness  of import  demand  to
price changes. When  price Is  stabilized,  the expected  transfer  losses  are equal  to HBEG  (  ABH  +
18BDE). The larger is the variance in price and the more responsive  import demand is to a change in
price, the greater are these losses.
The largest risk benefits from storage were obtained for sugar (12.31  %) (see column 2, Table 4).
This is explained  by the large estimated  standard  deviation  of price.  The risk benefits from storage
for maize and wheat differ somewhat, 1.67% and 2.63%, despite fairly similar price variances. This
difference  can be explained  by the differences  in the assumed elasticities  of import demand.
The welfare costs of the variable  tariff scheme (ABH + BDE) are the same as the transfer losses
from storage (HBEG). They are also determined  by the level of price variability  and the
responsiveness  of import demand to price changes. The net losses for maize and wheat are
respectively,  0.61 % and 0.65% of the average value of imports  for each commodity  (see column 1,
Table 4).  These small losses reflect the low level of price volatility  as measured by the standard
deviations. Slightly  greater net losses were incurred by wheat compared  to maize on account of
greater price instability. The net loss for sugar is 12.58%. This is relatively high compared to other
commodities  and is explained  by the high price variance  for sugar.
Finally, we compare these results with those derived using the expression  of Newbery  and Stiglitz
(equation  6.54 on p. 93) on the same data.  The risk benefits are much larger under the Newbery and
Stiglitz approach  (see column  3, Table 4).  For example, the risk benefit for sugar is 89.55%.  The
much larger estimate is explained  by the fact that welfare is measured in terms of income (i.e., price
times quantity)  and not in terms of welfare triangles as in our approach. Also, the risk benefits are
larger than reported in other studies using the Newbery and Stiglitz approach  because here price is
assumed  to be perfectly  stabilized, causing  the coefficient  of variation of stabilized  income to be equal
to zero; whereas, in other studies, stabilized  income is based on a partially stabilized price.  The two
approaches  give fairly similar results for transfer losses  with larger losses estimated  for sugar and
rice, and smaller losses for maize and wheat.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have extended the widely-used  Newbery and Stiglitz  approach to measuring the
economic  benefits from price stabilization  to a general equilibrium  setting. In this setting, any
19welfare change is measured in terms of net consumer  and producer surplus, rather than being
restricted to producer income effects  as it is under the Newbery  and Stiglitz approach. Like Newbery
and Stiglitz  we assume that domestic residents  cannot Insure privately, so that price stabilization
policies generate risk benefits by lowering  the variance in real income. But as Dixit and Stiglitz
(1981) have shown, the circumstances  accounting  for the lack cf private insurance are important  if the
appropriate  government  policies are to be followed. We have assumed  for the empirical analysis  that
private price insurance  is not possible because of government  restrictions on access to foreign capital,
so that domestic consumers  and producers  cannot smooth  their income by borrowing and lending
from foreigners or by using internationally-traded  financial instruments. Empirical analysis  focussing
on different reasons for the lack of private price insurance  will be the subject of further work.
The welfare effects identified  in our paper differ from those identified  by Newbery  and Stiglitz  where
transfer benefits for domestic residents  augment the risk benefits from reduced income variability. In
contrast, our welfare measures  for commodities  traded under small country  assumptions  are
ambiguous  because  there are transfer losses to foreigners  which are offsets to any potential  risk
benefits for domestic residents. Newbery  and Stiglitz  derive a formula for measuring  the welfare
benefits from price stabilization  based upon an assumption  of profitable  storage to stabilize prices
from one period to another.  We provide formulae for measuring  the welfare benefits in a general
equilibrium  setting when stabilization  is achieved  by storage and by a domestic variable import levy
scheme. These formulae differ significantly  and thus it is not appropriate  to use the Newbery  and
Stiglitz formula to justify the use of domestic  price controls  such as a variable levy.
Our analysis confirms  previous work which shows that (i) domestic welfare is lower under trade
policies which stabilize the domestic price, as they serve only to shift the price uncertainty  from
producers and consumers to the government  budget while incurring  the social costs of the tariffs and
subsidies, and (ii) while storage reduces  the variance in domestic  surplus by removing  uncertainty
from the world price, it also reduces  domestic surplus by transferring income to foreigners  who
receive the gains from profitable  storage -- under these circumstances  domestic welfare may rise or
fall because these transfers offset the risk benefits  from the fall in price variability (this ambiguity  is
not made clear by the Newbery and Stiglitz formulation).
In the empirical analysis  we compare the estimates  of the welfare effects of price stabilization  for four
20commodities  (wheat, maize, rice and sugar), typically imported by developing  countries, under a
variable tariff scheme and a storage scheme. We also compare the effects from storage as estimated
from the Newbery and Stiglitz  formula.  The results are worked out for a hypothetical  developing
country.
There are small risk benefits from stabilizing  through storage, as estimated  In the general equilibrium
formulation. These benefits are largest in the case of sugar, due to the world sugar price having the
largest variance. The measured  risk benefits are much  larger under the Newbery and Stiglitz
approach - a result explained  by welfare being measured in terms of income rather than in terms of
welfare for the general equilibrium  case. The offsetting  net surplus losses are much smaller than the
risk benefits in each case except for sugar where they are slightly larger.  In the Newbery and Stiglitz
case the risk benefits from stabilizing  the sugar price far outweigh  the net surplus losses.
The welfare costs of the variable tariff scheme  are generally  small, except in the case of sugar, due to
Its high price variance. By comparison  with the results under the tariff scheme which are always
negative,  the net benefits for maize, rice and wheat under storage are positive - illustrating  the
invalidity  of using results derived under an assumption  of stabilization  through storage for justifying
the use of domestic price controls.
While our discussion  has focused on a comparison  of the welfare effects of price stabilization  under a
variable tariff scheme and storage, we are not arguing in favor of either of these policy instruments.
Instead we argue against  them on welfare grounds. A better option is to use financial instruments  for
hedging  of commodity  price risks. But this means that there should be no controls over capital
instruments-which is one of the major reasons why private insurance  is seldom undertaken in
developing  countries. Such controls restrict foreign borrowing and lending and the purchase  of
toreign insurance  contracts and therefore reduces  private insurance. The use of commodity  futures
and options markets by some developing  countries  has grown over the past few years.  However,
many governments  in developing  countries  continue  to maintain  capital controls to protect their
exchange  rates and/or to restrict foreign investment. As a result, financial  risk management
techniques  have not been adopted widely  and variable  tariff schemes have tended to be the main
instrument  of price stabilization.
21Appendix
A.1 Taylor  series  expansion  of EVo yields:
V(p) + V^E{p  ^@E,p),p)
and Taylor  series  expansion  of EV,  yields:
V(o) + V-(T)E(f,-B,  - +  )E(I
These  cxpressions  are simplified  by noting E(p,-)  o  under  the scheme.  The value  of B, in (2)
equates ElV' to EV..  Note  that  under  the scheme  any change  in income  caused  by fluctuations  in
the world  price are captured  in the terms V,, and V  in general  equilibrium.
A.2 Using  the budget  constraint  without  price stabilization  (evaluated  at the mean  price),  (3.1)
becomes:
V = VM2  pj3X,  Vin-p
and using  the budget  constraint  with price stabilization  (evaluated  at tLe  mean  price),  (4.1)  becomes:
V, = Vm  EP  pj  -x V. in,
Therefore  the second  partial  derivatives  of the indirect  utility  functions  (evaluated  at the mean  price)
are:
22vk"'.xj  v  R- VW.  $  g  J  d  V  t  M  da '  VM  ER,-,;
MO  at  j  am at'  MO
v^,S = V,,,,  R £  1 1 +  jw  PM  dp  V,,xMm.
V7  = v  [R  ,,,'Pi  - v.  R
nice  .h.igher  order  ter.ms  in thbe  Taylor  series  expansion  on indirect  utility  ar,e  ignored  thris  implies  t.he
zort  demand  sched.ules.  are linear  where, (by  th.e  envelope  theorem  and Roy's identity):
_. 3 ,^,  82m,
V.  atu  as
<0O  is the measure  of relative  risk  aversion.
.
substituting  these  second  partial  derivatives  into  (2)  we have  (2.1).
The risk  benefits  in (2.2)  can be converted  to an expression  which  is similar  to that  derived  by
swbery  and Stiglitz,  as:
2.2')  _,  '=-  X op lz  (kg  i-  MO
ere:
23k, mP"  - is the budget  share of imports  evaluated  at  pf,  and,
'0f
V5.  E0  am, p-, - the import elasticity  of demand for good.i with respect to its own domestic  price.
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